Economists
Ronald Coase
COASE rhymes with "close" (rows), not with "cause"
Also Known As R. H. Coase
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Ronald H. Coase was a British economist who spent most of his academic career at the University of Chicago Law School and is a founding figure of New Institutional Economics and of law and economics as a field. His 1937 essay The Nature of the Firm asked why firms exist at all if markets coordinate production efficiently, and answered that firms arise to internalize transactions whose costs, of search, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement, are cheaper to bear inside a managed hierarchy than to repeat across an open market. His 1960 essay The Problem of Social Cost extended the same transaction-cost logic to externalities, arguing that when parties can bargain freely and transaction costs are negligible, the initial legal assignment of a property right does not affect the efficient outcome, only who bears the cost of reaching it, an argument known as the Coase theorem; where transaction costs are significant, as in most real markets, Coase treated the careful design of property rights and institutions, not the theorem's frictionless special case, as the more important lesson. He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1991 for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy.
Facts
NationalityBritish, later resident in the United States 1 Cross-Tradition Connections
Associated With School
Concepts Originated
Influenced
Additional Source WikipediaOliver Williamson, "Life and career" section Sources
1. Encyclopaedia Britannica
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
The Nature of the Firm
Ronald H. Coase, Economica, 1937
The Nature of the Firm
Ronald H. Coase, Economica, 1937Concepts Originated: Transaction Costs, Section IIQuote, Concepts Originated: Transaction Costs, Section II
Coase introduced transaction costs in his 1937 paper The Nature of the Firm to explain why firms exist at all rather than every exchange being negotiated directly on the open market.
The Problem of Social Cost
Ronald H. Coase, Journal of Law and Economics, 1960
The Problem of Social Cost
Ronald H. Coase, Journal of Law and Economics, 1960Concepts Originated: Property Rights, Section VIIIQuote, Concepts Originated: Property Rights, Section VIII
Coase's 1960 paper The Problem of Social Cost argued that clearly defined property rights, not regulation, allow parties to bargain their way to an efficient outcome when transaction costs are low.
The Problem of Social Cost
Ronald H. Coase, Journal of Law and Economics, 1960Concepts Originated: Externalities, Section IQuote, Concepts Originated: Externalities, Section I
The Problem of Social Cost reframed externalities as a reciprocal problem of conflicting resource uses rather than a one-directional harm requiring a Pigouvian tax.
Wikipedia
Wikimedia FoundationInfluenced: Oliver Williamson, Oliver Williamson, "Life and career" sectionQuote, Influenced: Oliver Williamson, Oliver Williamson, "Life and career" section
A student of Ronald Coase, Herbert A. Simon and Richard Cyert, he specialized in transaction cost economics.
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